Privacy Year in Review: Privacy and VoIP Technology by Morris, John B., Jr.
Privacy Year in Review: Privacy and VoIP
Technology
JOHN B. MORRIS, JR.*
ABSTRACT
Voice over internet protocol ("VoIP") technology is increasingly
being used throughout the nation. VoIP technology provides for
real-time voice communications using an Internet application.
Because VoIP technology uses the Internet, security issues arise
from third-party attempts at eavesdropping. This technology can
also be intercepted under wiretap laws. The means of obtaining
these conversations presents new issues for law enforcement
agencies because VoIP does not travel along traditional telephone
networks and various means of obtaining VolP are available.
Privacy concerns also arise with the vast amount of information
that can be obtained from VoIP communications over traditional
telephone networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The usage of Internet-based telephone service - VoIP, "voice over
IP (Internet Protocol)," or "voice on the net" technology - is
exploding, and VoIP is rapidly becoming a very valuable application
for users of broadband (or high-speed) access to the Internet.
Although VoIP's penetration into the telephone market is still
relatively small, the major providers of VoP services are seeking
tremendous growth. While in many (if not most) cases VoIP services
are not the motivating force behind users' decision to pay for
broadband access, once users have broadband they often try - and
adopt - VoIP services.
As VoP moves into the mainstream, questions of users' privacy
become increasingly important. Although some VoIP services attempt
to mimic closely traditional telephone service, the underlying
technology is quite different from "plain old telephone service"
("POTS"), and VoIP technology raises new privacy and security issues
to consider.
This article first provides a very brief overview of VoP
technology as it is being offered in the marketplace. It then considers,
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in turn, VolP privacy issues vis-A-vis (a) hackers and other attackers,
(b) the government, and (c) ISPs and VolP service providers. Finally,
it discusses one increasingly important issue related to VoIP
technology - the privacy of users' location information.
II. VolP TECHNOLOGY
VolP technology is, at its simplest, an Internet application that
allows real-time voice communications, in much the same way that
"instant messaging" allows real-time text communications. Many,
though not all, VoIP services are based on the "Session Initiation
Protocol" ("SIP"),' which handles the "call setup" process to initiate
and terminate calls. In most cases, the entire phone call is carried over
the public Internet or over the public Internet to a "gateway" that
connects to the traditional phone system. There are, however, a wide
array of flavors of VolP, with sometimes differing security properties
and privacy concerns. Among the different flavors of VolP are:
VoIP within a telephone carrier's network. Technically, many
current users of "plain old telephone service" are in fact already
unknowingly using VolP technology, because many traditional
telephone carriers (especially long distance carriers such as AT&T,
MCI, and Sprint) have implemented "Internet Protocol"-based
networks within their existing traditional telephone networks. IP-
based networks can be far more efficient than older and more
traditional "circuit switched" networks. From the perspective of the
end user, this type of VolP does not raise any significant privacy
concerns other than what arises within the traditional telephone
network.2
"Connected" VoIP provided by an Internet access provider. Led
by the cable companies (such as Cox and Comcast) that offer
broadband access to their customers, an increasing number of cable-
and DSL-based broadband Internet Service Providers are also offering
VoIP telephone service to their customers. This type of VolP is
designed and marketed to be as similar as possible to regular "POTS"
1 SIP was created by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the leading technical
standards-setting body for Internet protocols and technologies. Extensive information about
the SIP protocol is provided by Professor Henning Schulzrinne at
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/sip/.
2 Because in this context Vop is not being used over the public Internet but instead is used
over the carriers' private IP-based networks, the additional security concerns discussed below
are not raised here.
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telephone service. By using regular telephone numbers that can reach
and be reached by non-VolP phones, the VolP service is "connected"
to the traditional telephone system. Service providers generally
provide a box that plugs into a cable or DSL modem (or an Ethernet
network), and into which one or more standard telephones can be
plugged.
"Connected" VoIP provided by a third party service provider.
Another common model is for a service provider (such as Vonage or
AT&T CallVantage) to offer VolP that is unrelated to the ISP which
provides access to the Internet. Like VoP provided by ISPs, this
service also uses regular phones and phone numbers and is intended to
be as similar as possible to POTS.
"Computer-to-computer" VoIP provided by a third party service
provider. Some VolP providers (such as Pulver.com's Free World
Dialup and Skype) focus their core service on facilitating voice
communications between computer users on the Internet, without
necessarily connecting to the traditional phone system. This type of
service does not necessarily use phone numbers or regular phones.
Typically, the service is run through a computer with headphones or a
VoIP phone connected to the computer or network. These services are
usually free for computer-to-computer calls.
Self-provided "computer-to-computer" VoIP. VoIP can be
implemented using public standards and protocols, entirely without a
"service provider." Thus, two or more individuals or companies could
connect to each other using software entirely controlled by the users
(and not by any outside "provider").
These different models of VolP service raise, in many cases,
different privacy and security concerns (and indeed, even within one
type of VolW service identified above, there are important technical
differences in how each individual service is provided). Some of the
differences are highlighted below.
III. VoP AND SECURITY FROM THIRD PARTY ATTACK
Because for most VoP communications some or all of the
communication travels over the public Internet, VoIP faces an array of
security issues similar to that found with most Internet
communications, and some of the security threats implicate privacy
concerns. Among the concerns that will arise are "VolP spam" and
scams using spoofed (or faked) Caller-ID information showing the
supposed origin of a VolP call. From a privacy perspective, it is at
least theoretically possible that third parties (meaning someone other
than a government or service provider) could intercept VolP
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communications as they traverse the Internet. The risk of such
eavesdropping is reasonably low and roughly the same as the risk of a
third party being able to intercept an e-mail. But, the risk for most
VoIP services today is greater than the comparable risk of an
unauthorized third party interception of a traditional POTS phone call
(which generally travel only over closed, non-public networks). As a
practical matter, however, this type of privacy risk is currently low for
VoIP calls.
Some VolP services - most prominently including the Skype
service - go a great distance toward eliminating this risk by encrypting
the voice communications. Thus, if someone were able to intercept
Skype-based VolP communications, the communication would be
unintelligible. Moreover, Skype's encryption is designed so that even
the providers of the Sklype service itself would be unable to decrypt a
Skype communication.
VoIP providers are aware of and are trying to address security
concerns surrounding VolP communications. As more and more
corporations use VoIP technology for both internal and external voice
calls, it is likely that VolP services will offer increasingly secure
options for VoliP calls.
IV. VOIP AND WIRETAPPING
Entirely apart from the security concerns discussed above, there is
no question that VolP communications can - from both a technical and
legal perspective - be intercepted pursuant to a court-issued wiretap
order. Legally, VolP communications (as well as any other Internet
communications) can be intercepted pursuant to Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title III"), 5 the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"),6 or the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA").7 Just as a
3 On the other hand, although the voice portion of Skype service is more secure than most
other currently available VoIP service offerings, call setup information is less secure on the
Skype system than with most other VolP services. Skype's call setup is done on a "peer-to-
peer" basis, and thus it would be fairly easy for a third party to know that one particular Skype
user is trying to place a call to another particular Skype user.
4 See, eg., Industry group sets out to make VoIP secure, Network World Fusion (Mar. 29,
2005), available at http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2005/ 0329indusgroup.html.
5 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968).
6 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
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traditional telephone company (or anyone else, such as an apartment
building landlord) is obligated to cooperate with a court interception
order, so too is an ISP or VoIP service provider obligated to cooperate.
As a technical matter, law enforcement agencies can intercept
VolP communications. As compared to interceptions of traditional
POTS calls, however, there are three important "big picture"
differences with the interception of VoIP calls. First, unlike with
traditional telephone networks (which are generally homogeneous and
slow to evolve), there are many flavors of VoIP, and thus differing
formats and protocols used within the differing VoIP services.
Second, unlike with the traditional telephone networks (which can
generally format an intercepted phone call into one standardized form),
the law enforcement agencies themselves may need to be able to
understand the differing VoIP formats. And third, unlike with the
traditional telephone networks (where law enforcement usually needs
to order only a single company to provide intercepted
communications), law enforcement may need to obtain information
about an intercepted VoIP call from two or more different companies
at the same time. For example, law enforcement might need to obtain
the "call setup" information from one source, and the call content itself
from another source.
All of these differences have led the United States Department of
Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to seek to extend the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA") 8 to
Internet communications in general and to VoIP communications in
particular. In March of 2004, the law enforcement agencies filed a
petition with the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
asking that CALEA apply to certain types of VoIP service. 9 Despite
strong objections raised in comments by a wide variety of parties, the
FCC generally agreed with law enforcement, and the Commission
issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM" 0 extending
CALEA to the Internet and certain VolP communications.
7 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1843.
8 Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 and 47 U.S.C.
§ 229).
9 Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve Various Outstanding Issues Concerning the
Implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Federal
Communications Commission, RM-10865 (filed Mar. 10, 2004), available at
http://www.cdt.org/digi-tele/20040310fbipetition.pdf.
10 In the Matter of Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 04-295, RM-10865 (released Aug. 9, 2004) ('NPRM"),
published 69 Fed. Reg. 56,976 (Sept. 23, 2004).
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Extensive comments were filed by numerous parties objecting to
the NPRM on numerous grounds, and the FCC has not yet finalized
the rules proposed in the NPRM. Among the main concerns about the
NPRM is the fact that the extension of CALEA to the Internet and
VoIP will give the Federal Bureau of Investigation the ability to
dictate specific design obligations, which providers of Voip services
must meet to be able to do business in the United States. Commenters
to the FCC argued that the ability of law enforcement to impose
technology design mandates would chill technological innovation and
drive technology development out of the U.S.' 1
Among the privacy concerns implicated by law enforcement's
attempt to force VoiP communications into the CALEA model is that
law enforcement will receive far more information, and far more
private information, with VolP interceptions as compared with
traditional POTS interceptions. For example, with a "pen register" or
"trap and trace" order in the traditional phone system, law enforcement
receives details about when a phone call was initiated, but receives
neither the content of the call nor any information about the call. If
CALEA is imposed onto VoIP calls, it is likely that law enforcement
would also seek to obtain the topic subject of the Voip call (because,
like e-mail, the subject of a proposed VolP call using the SIP protocol
can be transmitted at the start of the call).
It is not clear whether law enforcement's attempt to extend
CALEA to VoIP calls will be successful. There are many legal doubts
about the FCC's authority to take that action, and any final rule
extending CALEA will almost certainly be challenged in court. It is
possible that Congress will effectively pre-empt the FCC's rulemaking
and directly address questions concerning the wiretapping of VoIP
calls.
V. VOIP PRIVACY AND SERVICE PROVIDERS
There are strong protections in the traditional telephone system to
prevent service providers from intercepting and listening to their
11 Many of the objections are discussed in the Joint Statement of Industry and Public Interest
Groups on CALEA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the Joint Reply Comments of
Industry and Public Interest Groups on CALEA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. See Joint
Statement of Industry and Public Interest Groups on CALEA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(filed with the FCC on Nov. 8, 2004), available at http://www.cdt.org/digitele/
20041108intpubint.pdf; Joint Reply Comments of Industry and Public Interest Groups on
CALEA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (filed on Dec. 21, 2004), available at
http://www.cdt.org/digitele/2004122 ljoint.pdf.
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customers' calls. Such expectations of privacy have and will carry
over to the VoIP world, and it appears unlikely that ISPs or VolP
service providers will intentionally intercept customers' VolP calls.
Having said that, however, there nevertheless are significant
privacy concerns vis-d-vis service providers that would flow from the
extension of CALEA discussed above. If CALEA is extended to VolP
communications, there is a significant risk that ISPs and VolP service
providers would be forced by law enforcement to develop the
capability (within the service providers' networks) to eavesdrop on
their customers and determine exactly what type of Internet
communication the customer is utilizing at any given time.
Thus, the private service providers would have to develop an
internal capability to snoop on their own customers - a capability that
the providers do not currently have. This raises at least two privacy
risks. First, it is possible that the services providers would be tempted
to use the interception capability for their own commercial purposes. 1
Second, there is an unavoidable risk that rogue employees of the
service providers could abuse the internal surveillance capability.
VI. PRIVACY OF LOCATION INFORMATION
Although not uniquely tied to VoIP, there is increasingly cause for
concern about the privacy of information about the location of
telephone and Internet users. As communications (including cellular
and other mobile communications) increasingly use VoP technology
(and Internet Protocol technology more generally), there is an
increasing use of location information. This location information is
often generated by cellular tower triangulation, where location is
measured based on the signal strength to multiple cellular towers. The
location is increasingly being determined by using internal GPS
(global positioning system) technology within laptops and mobile
telephones. In some parts of the world wireless services providers are
already "pushing" advertisements to phones based on the location of
the phone (and thus the location of the user).
12 Although most service providers have generally disavowed any intention to snoop on their
customers, at least two examples (both involving small service providers) indicate that the
concern is well founded. See United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004) (a
small service provider used intercepted e-mails for the provider's commercial benefit);
Consent Decree, In the Matter of Madison River Communications, LLC and affiliated
companies, FCC File No. EB-05-IH-0 110 (Mar. 3, 2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-05-543A2.pdf (a small ISP blocked its
customers' VolP calls because the ISP, owned by a traditional telephone company, did not
want the customers to use VolP telephone service in lieu of traditional service).
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The technical community has developed technology to protect
location information in Internet Protocol-based communications. The
"geopriv" working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force
("IETF") is in the process of finalizing a protocol that would require
any transmission of location using IETF protocols also to transmit
privacy rules that must be honored.' 3 Although IETF protocols are
voluntary standards, the leading "third generation" wireless standards
bodies have indicated that they intend to incorporate the IETF's
geopriv protocol when it is completed, and thus there is a reasonable
prospect that users will have a significant element of control over the
use of their location information.
A significant exception to the concept that users will control their
location information arises in the emergency or "E-9 11" context, in
which service providers face obligations under FCC rules to be able to
provide the location of a user who places a 911 emergency call. As
part of its location privacy work, the IETF is working to facilitate the
secure delivering of location information in the event of an14
emergency.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although VolP technology has existed for more than ten years, it is
only in the past two years that its use has entered the mainstream.
VolP is therefore still very much a new and evolving technology. As
such, all of the privacy problems have not yet arisen, nor have all of
the possible privacy protections yet been deployed. Many of the
privacy concerns discussed above are somewhat theoretical, or at least
have yet to develop into broad problems with widespread abuses.
Many in the VolP technology development community are committed
to strong privacy protections, and so there is a reasonable chance that
VolP will prove to be a fairly privacy-friendly technology.
13 See J. Morris et al., Geopriv Requirements, RFC 3693 (February 2004), available at
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3693.txt.
14 See generally Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technologies (ecrit),
http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ecrit-charter.html (last modified March 7, 2005).
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